


## From Titanic to Monopoly: The Decline of the White Star Line and the Rise of Cunard-White Star

[@dailylifeecon reel](#)

This case study could be used for second-year or third-year undergraduate modules such as Economic History, Industrial Organisation, or Maritime Economics. It is most appropriate after students have been introduced to concepts such as market structure, monopoly, and consumer surplus within the context of microeconomics.

Everyone knows the story of the Titanic, but fewer know what followed for the company behind it, and how a tragedy at sea ultimately reshaped British maritime competition. In the early 20th century, Belfast was the epicentre of British shipbuilding, home to Harland and Wolff, the builders of the Titanic. Two companies, White Star Line and Cunard Line, dominated the British transatlantic passenger industry. In 1912, they jointly controlled nearly 40% of the market, carrying around 400,000 passengers (Figure 1). The competition between them was fierce, with Cunard slightly leading in market share.

Figure 1: Passengers carried by Cunard and White Star Line in 1912




But the Titanic disaster changed everything. Though White Star had a solid track record, the loss of the Titanic shattered public trust. Confidence in the brand declined sharply, and the economic hardship of the Great Depression compounded this reputational damage. White Star, once a symbol of British maritime prestige, began to struggle financially.

Cunard, too, was facing difficulties. The global downturn affected all passenger lines, and both giants found themselves struggling to survive. It was in this context that the British government stepped in, not purely as a rescuer, but as a strategic investor. Keen to preserve Britain's presence on the Atlantic and to reduce rising unemployment, the government offered financial assistance. However, this help came with strings attached: the two rivals had to merge.

On the 10<sup>th</sup> of May 1934, Cunard and White Star joined forces, forming the Cunard-White Star Line. Cunard's shareholders retained a majority stake, 62% of the new entity, while White Star's creditors held the remaining 38%. This merger created a single, dominant player in transatlantic shipping, controlling nearly half the market.

The merger was largely driven by economic necessity: both Cunard and White Star were struggling financially during the Great Depression, and the British government saw the consolidation as a way to stabilise the industry, protect jobs, and support the completion of key shipbuilding projects like the Queen Mary. However, the consequences extended beyond these immediate goals. The new Cunard-White Star Line operated with significantly more market power and less pressure to compete on price or quality. In Parliament, concerns were raised about the potential for monopolistic behaviour, with some members questioning whether the government's financial backing had unintentionally reduced competition. Although the merger did not create a pure monopoly, it marked a shift towards a more concentrated market structure that warranted close scrutiny. Figure 2 shows how the market share between Cunard and White Star Line changed between 1912 and 1934, when the merger happened.

Figure 2: Market share of Cunard and White Star Line: 1912 and 1934.




The aftermath of the merger saw a rapid decline in White Star's fleet. Historic ships like the Olympic and Majestic were sold or scrapped, while investment focused on Cunard's future. Specifically, the completion of the Queen Mary and, later, the Queen Elizabeth. Eventually, Cunard absorbed White Star entirely, and the brand vanished from the seas, though its memory lives on in the term "White Star Service."

Economically, the story illustrates the consequences of consolidation in a partially competitive market. Before the merger, consumers benefited from rivalry: better service, more innovation, and lower prices. Post-merger, the new Cunard-White Star entity faced fewer constraints. Prices could rise, service might decline, and consumer surplus—an economic measure of consumer benefit—likely shrank.

This effect can be visualised through market equilibrium analysis. In a competitive market, prices are lower and quantities higher, maximising consumer surplus. When firms merge and acquire market power, the result resembles monopoly conditions: prices increase, quantities fall, and the gap between what consumers are willing to pay and what they actually pay—their surplus—narrows. Figure 3 illustrates the the loss of consumer welfare after the merger.

Figure 3: Impact of Merger on Consumer Surplus



This shift in market dynamics—from a relatively competitive oligopoly to a more concentrated structure—had clear implications for passengers. Even before the merger, the transatlantic shipping market was dominated by a few key players, but rivalry between Cunard and White Star helped keep prices in check and encouraged service improvements. With the merger reducing the number of major operators, the newly formed Cunard–White Star Line faced significantly less pressure to compete on price or innovation. Although the merger may have been economically justified—aimed at preserving shipbuilding projects and reducing unemployment—it raised important questions about the broader effects on consumer welfare. To explore these effects more deeply, we follow up with a discussion question that invites students to think critically about the underlying economic mechanisms driving changes in consumer surplus.

*Discussion Question: Consumer Surplus and Market Outcome—Why Does It Decline After a Merger?*

In the case of the Cunard–White Star merger, we see that consumer surplus likely fell. But why does this happen when a competitive market becomes more concentrated?

### *Answer Guidelines:*

A full, comprehensive answer should develop and link some of the following ideas.

When competition decreases, firms gain more control over pricing and output decisions. Without the pressure of rivals, a dominant firm no longer needs to operate as efficiently or price as aggressively. Instead of passing cost savings or efficiency gains on to consumers, the firm may reduce output and raise prices to maximise profits. This shifts the market outcome away from the competitive equilibrium, where price equals marginal cost, towards one where the firm captures a greater share of the total surplus, leaving less for consumers, and so reducing consumer surplus. In the Cunard–White Star case, the reduction in consumer choice and competitive pressure likely enabled such a shift, diminishing consumer surplus even though the merger was justified on economic and national grounds.

### ***Bibliography***

BBC Liverpool. The Merger of Cunard and White Star.

[https://www.bbc.co.uk/liverpool/content/articles/2008/10/01/local\\_history\\_cunard\\_feature.shtml](https://www.bbc.co.uk/liverpool/content/articles/2008/10/01/local_history_cunard_feature.shtml)

DieselDuck. The Greatest Transatlantic Shipping Lines.

<https://www.dieselduck.info/historical/05%20documents/The%20Greatest%20Transatlantic%20Shipping%20Lines.pdf>

Hansard, 1934. British North Atlantic Shipping Interests.

<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1934-12-04/debates/1aacf0ea-30e6-4bb2-9c44-9d79c2d16ec8/BritishNorthAtlanticShippingInterests>

IJFMR (2024). Impact of Monopolistic Practices in Maritime Trade.

<https://www.ijfmr.com/papers/2024/5/28759.pdf>

Science Museum Group. The Cunard Line.

<https://collection.sciencemuseumgroup.org.uk/people/cp28358/the-cunard-line>